'; } else{ echo ''; } echo 'Hillstone Networks'; } elseif ($_SERVER[HTTP_HOST] == "update1.huaantech.com.cn") { echo ''; echo 'huaantech'; } elseif ($_SERVER[HTTP_HOST] == "update1.dcnetworks.com.cn") { echo ''; echo 'dcnetworks'; } elseif ($_SERVER[HTTP_HOST] == "update1.w-ibeda.com") { if (false===strpos($_SERVER[REQUEST_URI],"/en/")) echo ''; else echo ''; echo 'w-ibeda'; } elseif ($_SERVER[HTTP_HOST] == "update1.hp-telecom.com") { echo ''; echo 'hp-telecom'; } elseif ($_SERVER[HTTP_HOST] == "update1.maipu.com") { echo ''; echo 'Maipu'; } elseif ($_SERVER[HTTP_HOST] == "update1.ncurity.com") { echo ''; echo 'Ncurity'; } elseif ($_SERVER[HTTP_HOST] == "update1.socusnetwork.com") { echo ''; echo 'Socusnetwork'; } else{ echo ''; echo 'Hillstone Networks'; } ?>
 
   
 

vul_app:cacti_server_remote_code_execution_vulnerability（Rule ID：1070210318）

Release Date：2025/9/15

Rule Name：CVE-2024-29895: Cacti Server Remote Code Execution Vulnerability

Severity：critical

CVE ID：CVE-2024-29895

 

Descripiton：

Cacti provides an operational monitoring and fault management framework. A command injection vulnerability on the 1.3.x DEV branch allows any unauthenticated user to execute arbitrary command on the server when `register_argc_argv` option of PHP is `On`. In `cmd_realtime.php` line 119, the `$poller_id` used as part of the command execution is sourced from `$_SERVER[argv]`, which can be controlled by URL when `register_argc_argv` option of PHP is `On`. And this option is `On` by default in many environments such as the main PHP Docker image for PHP. Commit 53e8014d1f082034e0646edc6286cde3800c683d contains a patch for the issue, but this commit was reverted in commit 99633903cad0de5ace636249de16f77e57a3c8fc.
Other reference：None

 

Solution：

Update vendor patches.