'; } else{ echo ''; } echo 'Hillstone Networks'; } elseif ($_SERVER[HTTP_HOST] == "update1.huaantech.com.cn") { echo ''; echo 'huaantech'; } elseif ($_SERVER[HTTP_HOST] == "update1.dcnetworks.com.cn") { echo ''; echo 'dcnetworks'; } elseif ($_SERVER[HTTP_HOST] == "update1.w-ibeda.com") { if (false===strpos($_SERVER[REQUEST_URI],"/en/")) echo ''; else echo ''; echo 'w-ibeda'; } elseif ($_SERVER[HTTP_HOST] == "update1.hp-telecom.com") { echo ''; echo 'hp-telecom'; } elseif ($_SERVER[HTTP_HOST] == "update1.maipu.com") { echo ''; echo 'Maipu'; } elseif ($_SERVER[HTTP_HOST] == "update1.ncurity.com") { echo ''; echo 'Ncurity'; } elseif ($_SERVER[HTTP_HOST] == "update1.socusnetwork.com") { echo ''; echo 'Socusnetwork'; } else{ echo ''; echo 'Hillstone Networks'; } ?>
 
   
 

xss_xss:obfuscated_xss_indirect_sink_invocation（Rule ID：1030010030）

Release Date：2026/9/21

Rule Name：Obfuscated XSS: Indirect Sink Invocation and Evasive Event-Handler Injection

Severity：high

CVE ID：

 

Descripiton：

Detects XSS payloads that evade classic tag/keyword signatures by obfuscating the JavaScript execution primitive instead of the HTML wrapper: (1) invocation of the alert/confirm/prompt/eval sinks through Function.prototype.call/apply/bind or optional chaining, passing a sink as an array callback (e.g. [1].some(confirm)), or AngularJS sandbox-escape constructor.constructor('...') chains; (2) execution of decoded strings such as eval(atob("...")) used to smuggle Base64 payloads past keyword filters; (3) bracket-notation or optional-chain access of sensitive DOM members (document["cookie"], document?.cookie, window['alert']) that defeats plain-substring keyword rules; (4) HTML attribute injection carrying event handlers with whitespace, encoded-newline (%0A/%250A) or tag-insertion (o<x>nfocus) evasion, e.g. "onwheel=ead(111), <svg%0Aonauxclick=0;[1].some(confirm)//, "><p onmouseenter=window.location.href=//attacker.site>. Handler matching follows the OWASP Coraza/ModSecurity CRS 4.2.0 attribute-injection shape whose false-positive boundary is field-proven; the rule is derived from GoTestWAF verdict evidence where all these forms bypassed the engine's classic XSS signatures. This rule supports to defend the A3: Injection of OWASP Top 10 - 2021.
Other reference：None

 

Solution：

Update vendor patches.